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Drew Fudenberg

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Dynamic Models of Oligopoly

Drew Fudenberg · Taylor & Francis Group

96 sayfa · 2002

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Game Theory

Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole · MIT Press

591 sayfa · 1991

Economics, Mathematical / Game theory / Mathematical Economics / open_syllabus_project / Théorie des jeux

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

27 sayfa · 1987

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game theory

Drew Fudenberg · World Book Publishing Company

Sayfa sayısı yok · 2019

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The theory of learning in games

Drew Fudenberg · The MIT Press

285 sayfa · 1998

Game theory / Economics, study and teaching / Educational games / Economics / Social evolution

Dynamic models of oligopoly

Drew Fudenberg · Routledge

83 sayfa · 1986

Mathematical models / Oligopolies / BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General

Bo yi lun

Drew Fudenberg · Zhong guo ren min ta xue chu ban she

526 sayfa · 2002

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Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales

Drew Fudenberg · Massachusetts Institute of Technology

22 sayfa · 1988

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Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

Drew Fudenberg · Massachusetts Institute of Technology

23 sayfa · 1988

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Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

32 sayfa · 1987

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On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

12 sayfa · 1987

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Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria

Drew Fudenberg · Massachusetts Institute of Technology

21 sayfa · 1988

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Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts

Drew Fudenberg · Massachusetts Institute of Technology

59 sayfa · 1988

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Monopoly and credibility in asset markets

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

31 sayfa · 1989

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The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

36 sayfa · 1984

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Sequential bargaining with many buyers

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

18 sayfa · 1985

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Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

30 sayfa · 1987

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Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

39 sayfa · 1987

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Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

50 sayfa · 1991

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Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

22 sayfa · 1989

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The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

58 sayfa · 1989

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Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

37 sayfa · 1991

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Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

49 sayfa · 1991

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Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

68 sayfa · 1991

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Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

20 sayfa · 1987

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Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

90 sayfa · 1987

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An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

33 sayfa · 1989

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Predation without reputation

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

22 sayfa · 1985

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