Yazar

ge deng

29 cilt bulundu.

Cilt sonuçları

Game Theory

Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole · MIT Press

591 sayfa · 1991

Economics, Mathematical / Game theory / Mathematical Economics / open_syllabus_project / Théorie des jeux

The theory of learning in games

Drew Fudenberg · The MIT Press

285 sayfa · 1998

Game theory / Economics, study and teaching / Educational games / Economics / Social evolution

Dynamic Models of Oligopoly

Drew Fudenberg · Taylor & Francis Group

96 sayfa · 2002

Kategori yok

Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

90 sayfa · 1987

Kategori yok

Dynamic models of oligopoly

Drew Fudenberg · Harwood Academic Publishers

83 sayfa · 1986

Mathematical models / Oligopolies / BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General

A long-run collaboration on long-run games

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine · World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd

391 sayfa · 2008

Game theory

Liang zi chu liao hao jian dan!

Ge deng (Gordon, Richard, 1948- ) · Xiang shi wen hua chu ban

207 sayfa · 2008

Force and energy / Healing / Touch / Therapeutic use / Recovery of Function

Zhe xie xin tai shi bi xu de

Liu deng ge · Xin shi jie chu ban she

Sayfa sayısı yok · 2008

Xin li zhuang tai / Tong su du wu .

Zhe xie xi guan shi bi xu de

Liu deng ge · Xin shi jie chu ban she

Sayfa sayısı yok · 2008

Xi guan / Tong su du wu . / Pei yang

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

27 sayfa · 1987

Kategori yok

Predation without reputation

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

22 sayfa · 1985

Kategori yok

The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

36 sayfa · 1984

Kategori yok

Sequential bargaining with many buyers

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

18 sayfa · 1985

Kategori yok

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

33 sayfa · 1989

Kategori yok

Self-confirming equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

29 sayfa · 1991

Kategori yok

Learning mixed equilibria

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

63 sayfa · 1992

Kategori yok

Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

33 sayfa · 1988

Kategori yok

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

50 sayfa · 1991

Kategori yok

Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

22 sayfa · 1989

Kategori yok

The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

Drew Fudenberg · Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

58 sayfa · 1989

Kategori yok

Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

37 sayfa · 1991

Kategori yok

Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

49 sayfa · 1991

Kategori yok

Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

68 sayfa · 1991

Kategori yok

Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

20 sayfa · 1987

Kategori yok

Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

32 sayfa · 1987

Kategori yok

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

12 sayfa · 1987

Kategori yok

Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents

Drew Fudenberg · Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

30 sayfa · 1987

Kategori yok

Software compatibilityThe neo-Luddite's lamentGlenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Harvard Institute of Economic Research

The neo-Luddite's lament

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Harvard Institute of Economic Research · Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University

Sayfa sayısı yok · 1999

Computer software / Development / Economic aspects / Mathematical models / Software compatibility

CiltPricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network goodDrew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good

Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole · Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University

Sayfa sayısı yok · 1999

Kategori yok